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When the toll rings around Bergen and Oslo were established in 1986 and 1990, 
respectively, they were part of a major scheme to speed up road investments. In Oslo 
twenty percent of the revenue has been allocated to public transport investments.  
The paper studies the impact of these major investments in road and public transport 
infrastructure on mainly on car travel and travel behaviour. The investment schemes are 
regarded as relatively successful viewed against of the aims of the investments and their 
historical setting. The transition from an old fashioned surface network of main roads to 
a modern highway system with extensive use of tunnels, has contributed to reduce 
congestion and environmental problems. Further, benefits for off-peak traffic have been 
large because of increased travel speed. Oslo, being three times bigger than Bergen, has 
still congestion problems whereas Bergen has hardly any. However, for the future, a 
continued road building strategy might prove less advantageous than before. For both 
cities urban sprawl appears to be the major challenge ahead.  2 
0 Background, purpose of the study 
The Norwegian Public Road Administration assigned Institute of Transport Economics 
to perform an evaluation of the effects of the main road investments in the two biggest 
cites in Norway – Oslo and Bergen. The study deals with several aspects (traffic, public 
transport, safety, environment, urban sprawl, transport industry satisfaction etc). This 
paper focuses on impacts on traffic and travel behaviour. 
Firstly, the paper describes the important features of the investment schemes and a short 
discussion of literature on induced travel. Emphasis is placed on the funding 
mechanisms (toll ring, government co-funding) and on description of the investment 
packages. Secondly, the effects for car travel are investigated. We look at developments 
in traffic volume, distribution of traffic in time and space, travel time, modal split etc. 
At the end other aspects are briefly touched upon, before conclusions are drawn. 
 
1 The Bergen and Oslo toll rings and infrastructure investment schemes 
Oslo is the capital of Norway and the Oslo region
1 has slightly more than 1 million 
inhabitants. It is located to the southeast of Norway. Bergen is located on the western 
coast and Bergen region
2 has around 340 000 inhabitants (facts on the cities and the 
investment scheme are give in table 1).  
In Norway there is more than 70 years experience in using road toll payment as a 
financial instrument for building bridges and tunnels. Up to 1980, less than 5 % of the 
total road investments came from toll revenues. Today about one third of the national 
road investment budget is based on toll fees. The urban toll rings are important 
contributors to this budget.  
The tolling tradition was one background for the toll rings in Bergen and Oslo. More 
important though, was congestion problems in both cities and especially in Bergen. 
Moreover, increased car ownership, urban growth and a national road investment profile 
that benefited remote regions contributed to a common understanding among planners 
and local politicians that infrastructure investments had to be sped up. The toll ring was 
not a major issue in Bergen, whereas in Oslo there was a big dispute before an 
agreement was reached. 
In Bergen a specific road investment scheme was established as part of the toll ring 
scheme. The toll ring was situated very close to the city centre with no or few 
possibilities to avoid the ring while going from one part of the city to another. The 
period of operation was originally from 0600h to 2200h, Monday to Friday. Today it 
has changed to 24 hours a day, Monday to Saturday. Only motorists driving into the 
CBD area are tolled. A single ticket was originally 5 NOK and is now 15 NOK (€1.9). 
The investment agreement was favourable to the Bergen community. Toll revenues 
amounted only to 25 % of the total investment scheme and were matched by the same 
amount of extraordinary national funding. For the period 1986-1997 the total road 
investment scheme in Bergen was 2.5 billion NOK (1996-prices). The Bergen toll ring 
was based on manual collection/inspection, but an automatic system (Autopass) was 
introduced in 2004. 
                                                 
1 Oslo and Akershus county. 
2 Bergen and 11 surrounding municipalities. 3 
Main investment projects in Bergen were principal roads into town from west and north, 
some improvements to the south, and a large road intersection connecting the three 
transport corridors of the city (see annex 1). The northern corridor was finished in the 
period 1988-1990. The western corridor was finished in 1993 (outer part) and 1999 
(inner part). The southern corridor has been subject to improvements throughout the 
whole period from 1990-2003. A new investment program has replaced the old one 
from 2003 and on-ward. The new program has put more emphasis on environment and 
public transport than the old road investment scheme.  
In Oslo twenty percent of the investment scheme was allocated to public transport 
investments (like reserved bus lanes and metro lines and terminals). The toll ring was 
located 5-8 km from the city centre forcing all car drivers to pass the toll ring while 
going from one part of the city to another. Only motorist driving into the city area are 
tolled, and the period of operation is 24 hours all days. A single ticket was originally 10 
NOK and is now 20 NOK (€2.5). The toll ring offers electronic fee collection, where 
cars have on-board units. The share of manual and coin box collection in Oslo has 
decreased from 40 % in 1991 to app. 20 % today. From 2004 electronic fee collection 
was harmonised in Norway. All toll roads use the “Autopass” system.  
Seasonal passes in both Oslo and Bergen were available. Toll revenues amounted to 55 
% of the total investment scheme in Oslo, while government co-funding covered the 
remaining 45 %. For the period 1990-2001 the total road investment scheme in Oslo 
was 11 billion NOK (1996 prices).  
Important investment projects in Oslo were a road tunnel close to CBD, connecting 
western and southern/ eastern part of the city, and tunnels from north and east into the 
city. Other main investments were large improvements on the outer ring road (Ring 3) 
and some road projects in the neighbour county of Akershus (annex 2). 
Studies of the traffic impacts of the toll rings indicate about 3-5 % traffic reduction in 
Oslo the first year and 5-7 % in Bergen (Ramjerdi 1995, Larsen 1988). In 2003 87 000 
and 245 000 cars passed the toll ring daily (one way) in Bergen and Oslo, respectively.  
 
Table 1. Central figures Oslo and Bergen 
 Oslo  Bergen 
Population (1000), municipality  522  238 
Population (1000), region  1011  340 
12 year investment (billion NOK, 1996)  11  2.5 
Toll ring established  1990  1986 
Initial toll fee, private car, NOK  10  5 
2004 toll fee, private car, NOK  20  15 
Number of passing cars daily (1000)  245  87 
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2 Road capacity and induced traffic – theory and methods 
Many studies indicate some level of induced traffic connected to increased road 
capacity (Goodwin 1996, SACTRA 1995, ENO 2002, Cervero 2003). Induced travel 
may be defined as increased travel caused by a decrease in the general cost of travel 
(ENO 2002). Traffic effects of increased population, employment or income are thus 
excluded. It can be measured as an elasticity of demand.  
Induced travel may take several forms (new trips, route diversion, mode switch, 
increased trip length, changed timing of travel). Effects may be estimated with respect 
to travel time, generalised travel cost or road capacity, and may also be estimated at a 
program/regional level or at a project level (ENO 2002). The former do not include 
route diversion. 
Further, induced traffic related to single projects is more likely to occur in outer parts of 
the city, as traffic in the city centre is generally suppressed by congestion and parking 
restrictions. Effects are usually larger in the long run than in the short run, since the 
major mechanism, land use changes, takes its time. However, it is difficult to determine 
the role of road investment on urban sprawl, in growing cites. 
Based on theoretical calculations and literature reviews, Goodwin (1996) gives an 
average value for the elasticity of traffic volume with respect to travel time of about  
–0.5 in the short term and –1.0 in the long term. On average increased road capacity 
give an additional 10 % base traffic in the short term and 20 % in the long term. 
Goodwin’s estimates are in the higher end of elasticity intervals given by ENO (2002). 
Cervero (2003) points at city size, congestion level and the quality of the public 
transport system as important explanatory factors of the level of induced traffic. In an 
international context the cities of Oslo and Bergen are relatively small. City size and 
congestion level may be related, but not always. Bergen, being a much smaller city than 
Oslo, experienced huge congestions problems during the mid 1980s. At the time, delays 
were larger than in Oslo. 
At a certain phase of the development of road systems in cities, there is a transition from 
old-fashioned streets to a “modern” road network with extensive use of tunnels and 
crossings with overpasses. The transition implies increased road quality and higher 
travel speed. The increased road quality may itself induce traffic, since almost ¾ of the 
traffic runs outside peak-hours with no capacity restrictions. At later phases of 
development, road quality improvements may diminish, leaving increased road capacity 
as the only remaining effect. In the Oslo and Bergen investment packages, road quality 
improvements constitute an important part of the benefits.  
There is always the counter-factual problem. What would have happened if road 
investments were not sped up? First we may assume that urban growth and income 
growth would still continue, leading to increasing demand (figure 3, E0 to E2) and 
increased congestion and cost of travel. A new road might improve the situation, but 
due to increased demand travel costs might be even higher than in the initial situation 
(compare the 0- and 2-situation in figure 3). 
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Figure 1. Changes in demand and road network over time (Mannheim 1979). 
 
In our case, the formulation of a hypothetical road network would be speculative. The 
evaluation thus simply compares the before and after situations. However, 
considerations to (external) demand side changes are being made. 
The analysis is based on following data: 
•  Road investment data (no capacity data). 
•  Traffic statistics and counts (car traffic and public transport) 
•  Travel surveys  
•  Measurement of travel times along corridors 
•  Population, employment and income data 
 
3 Overall traffic development 
During the 1990s the Oslo region experienced traffic growth in line with national 
growth rates (+ 1.9 % per year) in spite of a much stronger increase in all the drivers of 
mobility like population, employment and income.  This leaves little room for signi-
ficant induced effects of road investments on car traffic, even though Oslo’s share of 
national road investments increased from 11 % before the investment package to 23 % 
after. Our interpretation is that the total volume of car traffic, only to a minor extent is 
influenced by the investment program. One must also consider that rush hour travel 
times were not imrpoved during the period. 
Bergen experienced a higher traffic growth than Oslo during the 1990s (+2.7 % growth 
per year). There are several reasons for this: 
•  The city and the region had been a laggard with respect to car ownership 
(previously limited utility of car ownership due to missing fixed links to 
surrounding islands and communities) 
•  The congestion problems were severe, but have more or less been solved 
•  Urban sprawl took place beyond the surrounding mountains 









In light of above arguments, it is almost surprising that Bergen did not experience even 
higher growth rates.  
 
Table 2 Growth in traffic, population and employment in  
the regions of Oslo and Bergen 1980-2002. Percent. 
 Bergen  Oslo  Norway 
Population      
1980-1990 6.0  7.1  3.8 
1990-2002 12.6  13.7  7.1 
Employment      
1980-1990 7.0 13.0  5.4 
1990-2002 13.4  15.4  10.4 
Private cars       
1980-1990 34.3  26.1  30.8 
1990-2002 35.9  21.4  17.8 
Traffic1      
1980-1990 56.0  40.0  44.0 
1990-2002 39.0  24.5  25.2 
1. Vehicle kilometres. 
 
4 Traffic development in corridors and local vs main roads 
Looking at parts of the city, traffic growth in outer parts of Oslo was stronger than in 
the inner parts, as expected on basis of the literature. The surrounding county Akershus 
experienced a traffic growth of 2.5 % per year in the period 1990-2002, whereas Oslo 
had a growth of only 1.1 % per year. However, due to urban sprawl Akershus also 
experienced a much stronger increase than Oslo in the drivers of mobility, such as jobs 
and population. Especially the number of jobs in Akershus grew fast during the period 
1990-2002 (27.4 % vs 9.6 % in Oslo). On the basis of the data available in this study, 
we have not been able to determine the role of road investment on urban sprawl, as 
scarce land resources and high prices on land will always tend to shift the growth of the 
city outwards. However, research mentioned above suggests an interaction between 
urban sprawl, increased car ownership and main road investment. 
Both in Oslo and Bergen growth rates in main transport corridors have been studied. 
Due to topography both cities have three distinct major transport corridors. In both 
cities, the findings indicate that employment and population growth seem to have a 
greater influence on traffic development in corridors than increased road capacity.  
In Oslo traffic has increased most to the northeast where congestion is low. However, 
the corridor also experienced a huge growth in jobs. In addition, in 1998, the new main 
airport of Oslo was moved from the 8 km west of the city to 45 km northeast. The 
southern corridor also experienced a large increase in traffic, even though congestion 
was, and is, severe. Employment and population growth are the main reason for traffic 
growth. The western corridor has by far experienced the lowest increase in traffic due to 
the “lost” airport, weak employment growth and severe congestion problems. 7 
Table 3. Growth in traffic and jobs by corridor in Oslo. Percent. 
 
Corridor 




West 8  15 
Northeast 35  40 
South   35  31 
 
In Bergen traffic growth was strong in all corridors. To the north and west, this was due 
to improved roads, as congestion in the before-situation was heavy, but delays have now 
diminished. Urban sprawl and a change in commuting pattern in the western corridor 
from ferry to car commute, did also contribute to the traffic growth. To the south, road 
investments have been moderate and congestion is unaltered. Still, the traffic increase is 
as strong as in the other corridors, due to land use development (offices, shopping 
centres, population growth). 
When it comes to route choice, there are some distinct effects of road investments. In 
Oslo, traffic growth occurred on the improved main roads both in the toll ring and at the 
city border (2.1 % yearly growth), while there was no growth on local roads. Closer to 
the city centre, traffic statistics indicate a reduction of 20 % in traffic on local roads 
crossing a inner ring road (Ring 2). 
In Bergen, there was no increase in traffic entering the city, while traffic through and 
around the city centre increased by 7 % per year during the 1990s. Further, in the 
southern corridor where there is a choice of routes, traffic volumes decreased on local 
roads, while there was a strong increase on the principal road. Thus, the goal of 
diverting traffic away from where people lived or stayed was to a large extent achieved. 
 
5 Congestion and timing of travel 
Reduced congestion was a main goal of the investment packages. In Bergen travel times 
have clearly been reduced. In the northern corridor delays were nearly 45 minutes on 
average during the morning rush hour and about 30 minutes in the afternoon. In the 
western corridor road delays were about 30 minutes both during the morning and 
evening rush hours. Both approach roads are now without delays after the building of a 
four-lane expressway. The results indicate that in a rather small city like Bergen it has 
been possible, at least for a period, to completely solve congestion problems by road 
investments. However, there are now indications of increasing congestion in the 
northern corridor.  
In the southern corridor delays have been slightly reduced. In the southern corridor new 
congestion problems have also arisen around newly developed industrial areas close to 
Bergen airport.  
 
Table 4. Rush-hour traffic delays (minutes) in Bergen. 
 North West South 
Morning,  1984 45 30 16 
“          2002  1-2  0  11 
Afternoon,  1984 30 30 10 
“         2002  1-2  0  6 
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In Oslo travel times have been measured on a yearly basis on 18 routes since 1990
3. 
Over time there are only minor changes in travel times and delays. In total, there is a 
small improvement in average speed during the morning rush hour, but no significant 
changes in the afternoon. Increased road capacity thus seems to have counterbalanced 
the growth in traffic with a small positive margin. The continuous struggle between 
traffic growth driven by urban and economic growth, and road capacity is illustrated by 
figure 4. By 1995 many larger road projects were finished. In the years 1995-1997 there 
was a period of strong traffic increase driven by an economic upswing. Around 2000 a 











Figure 2. Average travel speed (km/h) for peak traffic in Oslo. 1990-2002. 
 
Improvements have occurred along the outer ring road (Ring 3). To the north, average 
travel speeds are also relatively high. To the south, delays have increased due to 
population growth. To the west, the situation is relatively unchanged. Delays here are 
still the largest in the region. A peak-hour round trip from west has in total an average 
of 30-40 minutes delay, depending on the route.  
The investment scheme strategy has been to complete projects from the inner parts of 
the region and outwards. This strategy seems to have been rather successful. Road 
sections 10-15 km from the city centre have the largest delays, whereas traffic flows 
with more ease in the inner parts.  
An important aspects in both cities, has been increased road standard and raised speed 
limits. These improvements have affected the ¾ of the traffic that runs outside rush 
hours. Car travel is now conceived as more convenient and predictable. In Oslo, off-
peak travel time along the outer ring road (Ring 3, 18 km) has been reduced from 18 to 
14 minutes. In Bergen, the tunnels have, in addition, contributed to shorter travel 
distances. Some routes have become 2-3 km shorter. As the city road network now has 
undergone a transition to modern highway network, further improvements will not have 
the same effect on off-peak travel times. 
Changes in the departure times are most likely to occur if congestion is altered. Since 
there were only minor changes in travel times and delays in Oslo and the southern 
                                                 
3 Registration on 10 working days in September each year. Departure times varied (15 min intervals). 9 
corridor of Bergen, no significant changes in departure times were discovered. 
However, on the northern corridor of Bergen, where congestion originally was severe, 
there are clear changes in departure times on working days. Here, the spread over the 
day shows more distinct rush hour peaks after the road investments. The share of traffic 
carried out during the rush hour 7-9 in the morning and 15-17 in the afternoon increased 
from 30 % to 37 %. This finding suggests that there is some amount of 
“suppressed” traffic on the shoulder of the peak hours that might switch back to the 
central rush hour if road conditions are improved. Even though the switch back of this 
traffic pattern might reduce the effects of increased road capacity on average speed, the 
length of the peak period might still be reduced.  
 
6 Travel behaviour 
Travel surveys were available in both cites. In Oslo a postal survey was undertaken in 
1989 just before the opening of the toll ring. A national telephone survey with an extra 
sample for Oslo was carried out 2001. In Bergen there were telephone surveys from 
1992 and 2000. 
In Bergen, car travel seems to increase at the expense of walking, cycling and public 
transport. There seems to no clear link between where road investments are undertaken 
and where changes in public transport market share occur. There is one exception, from 
the west, where ferry was used for going to Bergen city, there is a marked change to 
more car travel after a new bridge was built.  
In Oslo walking and cycling is excluded from the analysis since there seems to be a 
considerable amount of underreporting of such trips in the 1989 postal survey. Looking 
just at motorised transport, there is a small shift towards more car travel. The public 
transport share in the region is reduced from 27 % to 23 %. These figures correspond 
almost exactly with traffic statistics on the city border.  
As in Bergen, there seems to be no clear link between where road investments are 
undertaken, and where changes in public transport market share occur. However, car 
travel clearly seems to get increasing importance in the outer parts of the city (figure 3). 
Further, the share of trips within the outer parts of the region (outside the toll ring), is 
greater than before (from 45 % to 55 % of all motorised trips). Thus, urban sprawl 
seems to act as a structural change that lead to increased car travel. To what extent road 











Figure 3. Public transport in Oslo region by area, 1989 and 2001.  
Per cent of total motorised transport. 10 
 
During the 1990s there has been a decline in the number of public transport passengers 
in all of the larger Norwegian cites. Bergen has experienced a larger decrease than other 
cities due to reduced subsidies and as a consequence increased fares and reduced supply 
(vehicle km). In fact, the negative trend in Bergen seems to be fully explained by trends 
in fares, supply, petrol prices and income. The subsidy level in Bergen is now less than 
10 % of costs, implying that public transport appears as a sheer commercial activity. 
The fact that the negative trend is almost fully explained by reduced supply and higher 
fares, may indicate that road investments only to a small extent affects public transport, 
due to limited competition between public and car transport.  
Oslo, on the other hand, has experienced a better development than expected by taking 
into account the developments in prices, supply and income. Improved public transport 
quality probably played an important role. Main improvements achieved through the 
investment program have been reserved bus lanes and fully connected metro services. 
Compared to Bergen, Oslo has a rather extensive public transport system. 
 
7 Other aspects 
Freighters are generally satisfied with the investment packages, especially in Bergen, 
were delays are significantly reduced. There are still some accessibility problems at 
major freight terminals in Oslo. 
Some transport operators in Oslo have moved their terminals way out of the city centre 
(20-30 km), stating that enough space and the value of land were the main location fac-
tors. But even if the quality of the road network is not mentioned explicitly, it is obvious 
that a developed trunk road system is a prerequisite for effective distribution of goods in 
the region from such remote locations. 
The road accident risk has been reduced both in Bergen and Oslo, but the risk reduction 
is slightly smaller than the national average.  
Traffic is diverted to main roads, and many main roads are constructed as tunnels. Thus 
large, densely populated areas are relieved from environmental problems caused by road 
traffic. Noise reduction is the most important element.  
 
8 Conclusion - overall judgement of the road investment packages 
The toll rings around Bergen and Oslo have been part of major schemes to speed up 
road investments. The main goal was to reduce congestion. This goal has more or less 
been reached in Bergen. Probably the small size of Bergen, only 340 000 inhabitants in 
the region, makes it easer to cope with congestion. In Oslo, which is three times bigger 
than Bergen, congestion levels are relatively unchanged in spite of massive investments. 
Still, the absence of improvements in peak-hour congestion levels in Oslo is not 
necessarily an indication of failure. The region has experienced rapid population and 
employment growth during the 1990s. Our conclusion is that increased road capacity 
has counterbalanced the growth in traffic with a small positive margin. Alternatively, a 
slow pace of investment could have lead to excessive congestion levels. This especially 
true if the willingness to endure congestion increases with increased income level 
(Stopher 2004), or there is some positive utility connected to commuting (Ory and 
Mokhtarian 2005). In that case, congestion levels could hypothetical become very high. 11 
The 12-year period analysed represent a relatively short time period. Sooner or later 
traffic growth will catch up with investments. Even in Bergen there are now signs of 
increasing congestion. Anyway, important benefits of the investments have been a 
transition from an old-fashioned surface network of main roads to a modern highway 
system. Travel speed outside peak-hours, which concerns ¾ of the traffic, is increased. 
Further, extensive use of tunnels, has contributed to reduce environmental problems. 
When it comes to the question of induced traffic, the evidence is mixed. In Bergen, 
where congestion problems are relieved, traffic growth clearly seems to have been 
stimulated by road investments. The main mechanism seems to be increased car 
ownership. In the Oslo region, where congestion is unaltered, the amount of induced 
traffic seems to be of less significance, given the strong growth in drivers of mobility.  
The difference in car travel growth rates between Bergen and Oslo may also have some 
relation to greater emphasis on public transport in Oslo than in Bergen, both with 
respect to the content of the investment program and with respect to subsidy level.  
However, due to limited competition between car and public transport, emphasis on 
public transport might affect the development of public transport more than car traffic. 
For public transport in Oslo, it is concluded that qualitative improvements, like reserved 
bus lanes and fully connected metro services, have played an important role. In Bergen, 
public transport has lost ground due to reduced public transport supply and increased 
fares. 
In Oslo, it seems that employment and population growth to greater extent than 
increased road capacity explain growth rates in traffic corridors. In Bergen both road 
investments and employment and population growth more or less equally explains 
traffic growth rates in corridors.  
Given the growth pressure in Oslo and Bergen and a traditional national road 
investment profile that have benefited remote regions, a forced pace of infrastructure 
investment in Oslo and Bergen seems to have obtained several objectives. This 
understanding has also filtered through to the public, as a high and increasing share is in 
favour of the toll ring, especially if the investment scheme also includes public 
transport. 
However, for the future, a continued road building strategy might prove less 
advantageous than before, since benefits will be more linked to increased capacity than 
increased travel speed off-peak. For both Bergen and Oslo, urban sprawl appears to be 
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